Is it ever okay to lie? It’s an important question on which there is no clear consensus. There are three problems to consider:
- those who have no right to the truth
- those who can’t handle the truth
- those who do not have the use of reason
Concerns: The concern of the first is for the safety and legitimate privacy of the innocent. Concern for the second is for people’s feelings and psychological ability to handle the truth. Concern for the third includes having to hold back on feeding the wonder and imagination of children or people with severe mental disabilities that do not have the use of reason, which could significantly increase their joy. Santa Claus and the tooth fairy are examples.
Most moralists will say one should never directly lie. One could use language that diverts from the question, artfully dodge it, or remain ambiguous, but one should never tell an untruth in order to deceive. But what about those situations where ambiguity or diversion will not work? Example: is a store clerk is under any obligation to tell a robber where the money is that he would like to steal? Would lying to the robber be immoral when no diversionary tactic comes to mind? Is it even a lie? Could a home owner falsely tell a Nazi soldier banging on his door that “There are no Jews hiding in this house” – when he cannot quickly think of a creative way to remain ambiguous? Would these untruths be lies?
This brings us to perhaps the most important question: What is the definition of a lie? Let us start with this: A lie is telling an untruth with the intent to deceive… But does the definition end there, or can we rightly finish this sentence with endings that address one or all of the three problems mentioned above? For example, which (if any) of the following four statements is the true definition of a lie?
a) Telling an untruth with the intent to deceive.
b) Telling an untruth with the intent to deceive – those who have a right to the truth.
c) Telling an untruth with the intent to deceive – those who can handle the truth.
d) Telling an untruth with the intent to deceive – those who have the use of reason.
Is one of these a good working definition of lying? Could you combine two or more of these? Or should we stick with the first definition, admitting no exceptions to the prohibition of telling an untruth to deceive?
What are your thoughts?
Following.
Perhaps “Is it ever okay to lie?” isn’t the proper question. “What is a lie?” needs to be examined. The first question could be, “Is it ever okay to tell an untruth?” And, “When is telling an untruth not a lie?”
The original text of the Commandment – “thou shall not bear false witness” – ends with the caveat “against thy neighbor”. (Ex 20:16)
I suspect this is why the CCC prefaces the discussion of lying with: “By “putting away falsehood,” [Christians] are to “put away all malice and all guile and insincerity and envy and all slander.””
After stating that “A lie consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving”, the subsequent parts of the CCC go on to describe the effects of a lie in terms of the evil it causes and of the necessity for just reparation.
In addition, it makes it clear that culpability is related to the harm suffered by the “victim” (in this case a Nazi officer). But such a falsehood can actually do good for the “victim” (if it prevents him from carrying out an atrocity)… which is the opposite of harm.
One begins to wonder if a “negative culpability” is possible…
In any event, the “no Jews here” falsehood in no way fits is with those descriptions. One is tempted to say “It may look like a duck, but if it doesn’t walk like a duck and quack like a duck and fly like a duck and poop like a duck, it probably isn’t a duck”.
I”m tempted to say that such a falsehood is simply not a lie at all.
I can understand perfectly well why the Church does not openly say so… many will hear it as “telling falsehoods in sometimes OK!” This would be easily taken as condoning proportionalism, which then turns into “I can do anything if I think I have a good enough reason”
But lies don’t always cause *visibly apparent harm.” If an act is inherently wrong, its apparent consequences are irrelevant. The first edition of the CCC’s definition of lying added to the one you stated with, “…to those who have a right to the truth.” With this definition, the falsehood said to he Nazi would not be a lie. However, the second edition took this ending out, and left the definition you stated, calling it intrinsically evil. Hence, the confusion.